

## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS APPROACH

DEVELOPING IN GERMAN MBFR POLICY

BEGIN SUMMARY: RELIABLE FONOFF SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED

OUR IMPRESSION THAT GERMAN MBFR POLICY IS TENDING TO

PLACE MORE EMPHASIS ON AVOIDING POTENTIAL OBJECTIVE

DANGERS OF RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN ALLIANCE DEFENSE

POLICY AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENT, AND

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LESS PRIORITY ON POTENTIAL DESIDERATA TO BE OBTAINED

FROM ENGAGING THE SOVIETS IN MBFR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. THIS SHIFTING EMPHASIS, WHICH DOES NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE LESSENER FRG SUPPORT FOR MBFR ENTERPRISE, IS MANIFESTED BY INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS FRG APPRAISAL OF SPECIFIC VERIFICATION, CONSTRAINTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTION ISSUES. IT HAS THE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE SUPPORT OF FONOFF STATE SECRETARY FRANK, POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL, AND MBFR EXPERT RUTH. BESIDES THE PERCEIVED OBJECTIVE DANGERS, THE CHANGING FRG APPROACH ALSO APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM CDU/CSU OPPOSITION PUBLIC CRITICISM, WHAT THE GERMANS ARE TERMING "THE WASHINGTON PAPERS" (EUPHEMISM FOR AMERICAN MBFR PRESS LEAKS) AS WELL AS A WISH TO SOFTEN FRENCH OPPOSITION TO MBFR AND THEREBY VITALIZE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THE U.S./EUROPEAN DIALOGUE AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

1. FONOFF MBFR DEPT CHIEF RUTH AND NATO DEPT DEPUTY CHIEF HARTMANN HAVE CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT GERMAN POLICY ON MBFR RECENTLY HAS BEEN EVOLVING TOWARD AN AUGMENTED EMPHASIS ON MINIMIZATION OF RISKS AND A DIMINISHED PRIORITY FOR AMBITIOUS POSITIVE GOALS. THIS DEVELOPING POSTURE IS LIKELY TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN A NUANCED FASHION ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND DOES NOT RPT NOT SEEM TO BETOKEN A DIMINUTION OF SUPPORT FOR THE MBFR ENTERPRISE PER SE, WHICH IN THE GERMAN VIEW REMAINS A VITAL INSTRUMENT OF ALLIANCE SECURITY AND DETENTE POLICY. BUT THE EMERGING FRG ATTITUDE WILL FURTHER UNDERSCORE THE ACCENT ON A CAUTIOUS AND CALCULABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD MBFR WHICH HAS MARKED FRG POLICY SINCE THE MARCH 1971 GERMAN PAPER ON THE PHASED MBFR APPROACH.

2. OBJECTIVE FACTORS. RUTH AND HARTMANN SAY ENHANCED FRG CIRCUMSPECTION ON MBFR IS THE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS - "OBJECTIVE, POLITICAL AND PERSONAL." THE MAIN "OBJECTIVE" CONCERN IS TO AVOID AGREEMENTS THAT COULD PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION A SAY IN OR A PRETEXT FOR INTERFERENCE IN ALLIED DEFENSE MATTERS OR THE WEST EUROPEAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENT. OUR SOURCES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS AN INCREASED ALERTNESS IN BONN, PARTICULARLY

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LARLY AT SENIOR POLITICAL AND POLICY-MAKING LEVELS, THAT THE POTENTIAL GAINS TO BE OBTAINED BY ENGAGING MOSCOW IN MBFR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WILL ALSO ENTAIL AS A COROLLARY INEVITABLE RUSSIAN COUNTER-DEMANDS EMBODYING THE ABOVE CITED DANGERS. OUR SOURCES BELIEVE THESE DANGERS CAN ARISE PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH VERIFICATION, CONSTRAINTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE ISSUE OF "AREA," WHICH

BURDENED LAST WINTER'S GAP EXERCISE, THIS SPRING'S  
EFFORT AT DEVELOPING AN MBFR GUIDELINES PAPER AND THE  
CURRENT NATO DISCUSSION OF AN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING  
POSITION, IS THE CENTRAL FEATURE OF THESE CONCERNS.

3. VERIFICATION.DESPITE THE ADVANTAGES SEEN BY  
FONOFF DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION EXPERT IN RELATIVELY  
EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF  
MEN AND EQUIPMENT, RUTH AND FONOFFSENIOR POLICY  
MAKING OFFICIALS TEND TOWARD U.S. POSITION THAT

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VERIFICATION SHOULD BE LIMITED ESSENTIALLY TO NATIONAL  
TECHNICAL MEANS. RUTH AND AILING AMB ROTH

PRESENTLY CONSIDER SOME TYPE OF "INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE" AS THE SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURE WITH THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL EFFECT, I.E., THE VERIFICATION MEASURE LEAST LIKELY TO REINFORCE THE NOTION OF A SPECIAL STATUS DISARMAMENT ZONE. THE FRG IS UNLIKELY TO ACCORD MUCH SUPPORT TO THE ON-SITE TYPE VERIFICATION MEASURES ENUMERATED IN PARA 15B OF THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION PAPER. AS A SENIOR DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD US RECENTLY, "WE DO NOT WISH ANY MORE SOVIET INSPECTION IN GERMANY THAN IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL."

4. CONSTRAINTS. THE SAME PATTERN EMERGES REGARDING  
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CONSTRAINTS, WHICH OUR SOURCES ACKNOWLEDGE HAVE BECOME A CENTRAL FEATURE OF WESTERN MBFR POLICY SUBSTANTIALLY DUE TO STRONG GERMAN URGING. KEY GERMAN OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO FAVOR LIMITING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND POLITICAL USES OF SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. BUT THERE IS A GREATER AWARENESS THAT WESTERN CONSTRAINTS DESIDERATA ARE BOUND TO ATTRACT SOVIET DEMANDS FOR LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED FORCE MOBILITY AND AN ENHANCED INCLINATION TO VIEW THE PRESERVATION OF WESTERN DEFENSE FLEXIBILITY AS, ON BALANCE, A SUPERIOR OBJECTIVE TO LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

5. THUS, IN DISCUSSION OF THE ALLIED POSITION PAPER, THE FRG CONTINUES TO OPPOSE THE PROPOSED PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINT INVOLVING LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES IN THE AREA (PARA 6 III) AND TO VOICE CONCERN OVER IMPLICATIONS FOR A FUTURE EUROPEAN UNION OF THE PROPOSED COLLATERAL CONSTRAINT LIMITING MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA (PARA 12 II). SIMILARLY, THE LONG-STANDING GERMAN WISH TO AFFECT THE RED ARMY'S FORCE PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IS BEING RE-EXAMINED WITH INCREASED ATTENTION TO U.S. CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE SOVIET DEMANDS ON FBS. THIS LATTER ISSUE REMAINS PARTICULARLY INTRACTABLE FOR BONN, HOWEVER, AS THE GERMANS CONCEIVE MBFR TREATMENT OF THE WMDS AS ONE WAY TO DISSIPATE THE APPEARANCE OF A SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ZONE CENTERING ON (ALBEIT NOT LIMITED TO) THE TWO GERMAN STATES. IN STRUGGLING TO RECONCILE CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES, THE FRG HAS DECIDED AGAINST THE IDEA OF WMD FREEZE (AS IN PARA 12 TER OF THE ALLIED POSITION PAPER) BUT SO FAR CONTINUES TO FAVOR REDEPLOYMENT OF MBFR WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES TO A POINT BEYOND THE WMDS AND PREANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW DEPLOYMENT OF ANY

SOVIET FORCES INTO THE WMDS. IN SUM, SAY OUR SOURCES, CONSTRAINTS REMAIN AN IMPORTANT PART OF FRG MBFR POLICY, PARTICULARLY THE PARA 12 PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES (I.E., READ SOVIET) INTO THE AREA (I.E., READ EASTERN EUROPE). BUT THE  
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GERMANS SAY THEY ARE FOCUSING A KEENER EYE ON THE DANGERS THAN THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF MBFR CONSTRAINTS.

6. REDUCTIONS. SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS ALSO CONTINUE TO SEE THE RISKS FOR ALLIED DEFENSE AND WEST EUROPEAN POLICY IN REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS (I.E., BUNDESWEHR)FORCES. OUR SOURCES HOPE THE LONG DIFFICULT STRUGGLE WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTRY OVER THE STATIONED/INDIGENOUS REDUCTION ISSUE AND THE COMMON CEILING/PHASE I-II LINKAGE QUESTION WILL BE SETTLED SOON AFTER FONMIN SCHEEL CONCLUDES HIS ASSIGNED "PROBING OPERATION" WITH DR. KISSINGER (SEE BONN 13310-NOTAL). BUT EVEN HERE, FONOFF OFFICIALS ARE QUIETLY BEGINNING TO CONSIDER HOW TO DESIGN AND FORMULATE AN AGREEMENT ON MBFR-II INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS THAT COULD AVOID DANGERS OF SOVIET INTRUSION.

7. POLITICAL FACTORS. OUR SOURCES SAY THESE SPECIFIC "OBJECTIVE CONCERNS" HAVE COALESCED IN GERMAN MBFR THINKING WITH A NUMBER OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS. FIRST, WHILE BONN HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED MBFR AS AN INSTRUMENT TO COMBAT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES FOR UNILATERAL U.S. TROOP CUTS, GERMAN ANXIETY HAS USUALLY TENDED TO MOUNT SOMEWHAT AS EACH NEW AND MORE CONCRETE PHASE OF THE MBFR PROCESS HAS APPROACHED. WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE POSITION IN ITS FINAL STAGE AND THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY ABOUT TO ENSUE, OUR SOURCES SAY INCREASED FRG CAUTION

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WAS TO BE EXPECTED.

8. SECOND, FOR THE LAST FEW WEEKS CDU/CSU BUNDESTAG LEADER CARSTENS HAS BEEN HAMMERING AWAY IN PUBLIC AND IN PRESS ARTICLES ON THE DANGERS OF "NEUTRALIZATION" OR DEROGATION OF GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICIT IN A SPECIAL STATUS ZONE THAT COULD EMERGE FROM MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. OUR SOURCES SAY CARSTENS' ATTACKS ON ALLEGED GOVERNMENT INATTENTION TO THESE CONCERNS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN OSTENSIBLY RISING PERCUSSION OF WARNINGS TO BONN FROM THE FRENCH AND BRITISH REGARDING THE DANGERS OF MBFR. WHILE THE NEGATIVE ANGLO-FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD MBFR IS NOT NEW, IT HAS NOT OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS BEEN WHOLLY WITHOUT SECRET

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EFFECT. IN PARTICULAR, THE FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY'S ASSESSMENT OF MBFR HAS GROWN CONSIDERABLY MORE NEGATIVE. THIRD, ALLIED SUSPICIONS AND OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF U.S./SOVIET BILATERALISM ON MBFR HAS MUSHROOMED (BONN 13529) AS A RESULT OF WHAT OUR GERMAN INTER-LOCUTORS ARE TERMING "THE WASHINGTON PAPERS." WE ARE TOLD THAT THESE ALLEGED U.S. LEAKS HAVE

FOCUSED THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIALS ON MBFR POLICY AND LED THE BUNDESTAG DEFENSE COMMITTEE "TO ROAST" DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER AT A COMMITTEE MEETING THIS WEEK.

9. FINALLY, FRANK AND VAN WELL HAVE APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT FRENCH CONCERNS OVER THE DANGERS OF MBFR CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A BURDEN ON FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND ON THE FRG WISH TO ACCELERATE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTENSIFY THE U.S./EUROPEAN DIALOGUE. WHILE THESE OFFICIALS DO NOT EXPECT FRANCE SUDDENLY TO JOIN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THEY DO HOPE A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO SPECIFIC ISSUES OF VERIFICATION, CONSTRAINTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE SOME SALUTARY EFFECT ON FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS. WE ARE TOLD OF FRANK'S PERSONAL WISH TO ATTAIN SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH FRANCE ON MBFR BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE ON OCT 30. BUT OUR SOURCES STRESS THAT BONN WILL NOT PURCHASE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING THROUGH MAJOR CHANGES OF POLICY.

10. PERSONAL FACTOR. WE BELIEVE ONE FINAL CAUSE OF THE ENHANCED GERMAN CAUTION ON MBFR ISSUES STEMS FROM THE ABSENCE FOR THE LAST TWO MONTHS, DUE TO A BACK INJURY, OF AMBASSADOR ROTH, WHO GENERALLY LEANED TOWARD IMAGINATIVE DEVICES TO CODIFY THE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET FORCES. IN HIS ABSENCE, RUTH HAS BEEN IN CHARGE OF THE FONOFF DISARMAMENT DEPTS AND HAS TENDED TO TAKE A MORE CONSERVATIVE LINE. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THESE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RUTH AND ROTH ARE OVER NUANCES RATHER THAN ESSENTIALS, THAT ROTH WILL BE RETURNING TO HIS OFFICE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS

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STIMULATING A HARDER FRG LOOK AT SPECIFIC MBFR ISSUES. IT THEREFORE REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE PRESENT SHIFTING DIRECTION WILL BE RELATIVELY PERMANENT OR MERELY TRANSITORY.

11. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS. IN GENERAL, A SLIGHTLY MORE CAUTIOUS FRG APPROACH WOULD APPEAR TO CORRESPOND TO U.S. POSITION ON MOST CURRENT ISSUES. THIS IS CLEARLY TRUE CONCERNING VERIFICATION AND INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS. IT ALSO COULD PERTAIN TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF CONSTRAINTS, SUCH AS THE DANGERS OF SOVIET DEMANDS ON FBS. THE HIGHLIGHTED GERMAN ALERTNESS TO THE "AREA" ISSUE MAY TEND TO WORK THE OTHER WAY, BUT THAT CUDGEL WOULD IN ANY CASE BE

TAKEN UP BY THE DUTCH AND OTHER ALLIES AND CLEARLY  
REPRESENTS A LONG-STANDING AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF  
GERMAN MBFR THEOLOGY.  
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